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Policies for Multi-Agency Recovery of Physical Infrastructure After
Disasters
Hemant Gehlot, Shreyas Sundaram, and Satish V. Ukkusuri
Abstract—We consider a scenario where multiple infras-
tructure components have been damaged after a disaster and
the health value of each component continues to deteriorate
if it is not being targeted by a repair agency, until it fails
irreversibly. There are multiple agencies that seek to repair the
components and there is an authority whose task is to allocate
the components to the agencies within a given budget, so that
the total number of components that are fully repaired by the
agencies is maximized. We characterize the optimal policy for
allocation and repair sequencing when the repair rates are
sufficiently larger than the deterioration rates. For the case
when the deterioration rates are larger than or equal to the
repair rates, the rates are homogeneous across the components,
and the costs charged by the entities for repair are equal, we
characterize a policy for allocation and repair sequencing that
permanently repairs at least half the number of components as
that by an optimal policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure systems such as power, transportation, water
supply, and sewers, face significant damage after disasters.
For example, Hurricane Dorian caused USD 50 million worth
of damage to North Carolina roads in 2019 [1]. Timely
recovery of infrastructure systems after disasters is required
not only to expedite return of displaced communities, but
also to facilitate the movement of emergency teams like
ambulances and fire-fighters [2].
There are several works in disaster recovery that focus
on the repair of infrastructure systems after disasters [3]–
[5]. Many of these studies such as [3] and [4] focus on the
recovery of single infrastructure systems like power networks
or transportation networks. In addition, most of these studies
do not consider accelerated deterioration of infrastructure
components after disasters due to processes such as corro-
sion. For instance, roads experience significant degradation
in their strength when they are submerged for prolonged
durations after floods [6]. Similarly, damage to wastewater
pipelines accelerates after the appearance of minor cracks
due to disasters [7]. Due to such deterioration processes,
infrastructure components can get damaged to such a level
(referred to as the permanent failure state) that they require
full replacement or repair, which could be very costly. Thus,
it is desirable to repair infrastructure components before
they reach the permanent failure state. Since infrastructure
components face accelerated deterioration after disasters, we
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assume that the state of a component does not change due
to normal deterioration processes once it is fully repaired
(referred to as the permanent repair state).
In this paper, we focus on the problem of maximizing
the number of damaged infrastructure components that are
permanently repaired after disasters, explicitly focusing on
accounting for the dynamics of the deterioration and repair
processes. The paper [8] focused on this problem considering
homogeneous rates of deterioration and repair across the
components and [9] extended the results to the case when
the deterioration and repair rates are heterogeneous across
the components. However, these studies considered a single
agency to repair the components, and did not account for
scenarios involving multiple agencies available for recovery
after disasters [10]. In addition, there could be a limited bud-
get that the government and other emergency management
agencies have in order to pay smaller agencies or teams to
repair the infrastructure components [11], [12]. Thus, it is
important to characterize optimal policies for the allocation
of damaged infrastructure to agencies after disasters.
There are several works that have focused on optimal
allocation of resources after disasters [5], [13]. However,
most of the existing studies do not focus on characterizing
optimal policies to allocate infrastructure components that
deteriorate with time (if not being repaired). Job scheduling
studies [14], [15] that focus on processing deteriorating jobs
over multiple machines have high-level analogies to our
problem. However, job scheduling studies typically do not
have a notion of permanent failure, i.e., jobs are processed
even if they exceed their due dates, whereas in our problem
components cannot be targeted once they permanently fail.
Also, jobs are said to be late if they are completed after
their due dates, whereas an agency should start targeting
a component before it permanently fails. There are also
some high-level analogies of our problem with scheduling
of real-time tasks [16], patient triage scheduling problems
[17], control of thermostatically controlled loads [18], [19],
optimal control for persistent monitoring [20], [21], resource
allocation at a base station to time-dependent queues/flows
[22], [23] and machine repair problems [24]. However, most
of these studies do not focus on allocation of components
under budget constraint and subsequent sequencing for re-
pairing the deteriorating components. Some of these studies
[16], [20]–[24] also do not consider the notion of permanent
failure of components/flows being targeted.
A. Our contributions
First, we characterize an optimal policy for allocating
components to agencies (and the repair sequencing to be
followed by the agencies) when the repair rates are suf-
ficiently larger than the deterioration rates. Secondly, we
characterize a 1/2-optimal1 policy for allocating components
to agencies (and the subsequent repair sequencing) when the
deterioration rates are larger than or equal to the repair rates,
the deterioration and repair rates are homogeneous across
all the components, and the costs charged by the entities
for repair are equal; we also prove that the aforementioned
policy is optimal when there is a single agency.
In the next section, we formally describe the recovery
problem and after that we characterize recovery policies
based on the relative sizes of the deterioration and repair
rates.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
There areN(≥ 2) infrastructure components (also referred
to as nodes) represented by the set V = {1, . . . , N}. In
the context of disaster recovery, a node can represent a
section of road network, or a portion of power network,
etc. There are M(≤ N) repair agencies (also referred to
as entities) represented by the set W = {1, . . . ,M}. We
assume that time progresses in discrete steps, representing
the resolution at which the nodes are repaired. We index
time-steps by t ∈ N = {0, 1, . . .}. There are two types of
control actions. The first type corresponds to the allocation
of nodes by an authority to entities at time-step 0. In the
context of disaster recovery, an authority could represent
a government emergency agency that distributes recovery
resources to smaller agencies [11]. For all h ∈ W , let
Uh ⊆ V be the set that is allocated to entity h. Note that
each node j ∈ V can be allocated to at most one entity (i.e.,
Ui∩Uj = ∅, for all i 6= j). The second type of control action
corresponds to the repair sequences that are followed by the
entities after the allocation of nodes. Let uht ∈ Uh be the
node that is targeted by entity h at time-step t.
The health value of node j ∈ V at time-step t is denoted by
vjt ∈ [0, 1]. The initial health value of node j ∈ V is denoted
by vj0 ∈ (0, 1). A node j ∈ V is said to be permanently
repaired at time-step t if vjt−1 < 1 and v
j
t = 1. A node
j ∈ V is said to permanently fail at time-step t if vjt−1 > 0
and vjt = 0. The health value of a node does not change
further once it reaches the permanent repair or permanent
failure state. The health value of a node j ∈ Uh increases by
an amount ∆j,hinc at time-step t if it is being targeted by entity
h at time-step t (and node j is not in the permanent repair
or permanent failure state at time-step t). The health value
of a node j decreases by an amount ∆jdec at time-step t if it
is not being targeted by an entity at time-step t (and node j
is not in the permanent repair or permanent failure state at
time-step t). Thus, for each node j ∈ V , the dynamics of its
1For α ∈ (0, 1], a policy is said to be α-optimal if it computes a reward
that is at least α times the optimal reward.
health are given by
vjt+1 =


1 if vjt = 1,
0 if vjt = 0,
min(1, vjt +∆
j,h
inc) if j ∈ Uh, u
h
t = j,
and vjt ∈ (0, 1),
max(0, vjt −∆
j
dec) if u
h
t 6= j, ∀h ∈ W ,
and vjt ∈ (0, 1).
(1)
Each entity h ∈ W has a cost per node ch ∈ R≥0 that
it charges from the authority in order to repair a node. The
authority has a constraint on the budget β ∈ R≥0 ∪{∞} for
paying the entities (when β =∞ we say that there is no bud-
get constraint). Thus, the total cost that is paid to the entities
cannot exceed β in an allocation, i.e.,
∑M
h=1 ch|Uh| ≤ β.
Remark 1: Note that although the above budget constraint
implies that an entity charges the authority for each node
allocated to it regardless of whether the entity permanently
repairs that node or not, the policies (i.e., allocation and
repair sequencing) that we characterize in this paper ensure
that each entity permanently repairs all nodes allocated to it.
We now define the reward function as follows.
Definition 1: Given a set of initial health values v0 =
{v10 , v
2
0 , . . . , v
N
0 }, an allocation U = {U1,U2, . . . ,UM}
that respects the budget constraint β, and repair sequences
u¯0:∞ = {u¯10:∞, u¯
2
0:∞, . . . , u¯
M
0:∞} for each entity, the reward
J(v0,U , u¯0:∞) is defined as the total number of nodes that
get permanently repaired through the repair sequences after
the allocation. More formally, J(v0,U , u¯0:∞) = |{j ∈
V | ∃ t ≥ 0 s.t. vjt = 1}|.
Based on the above definitions, the following problem is
the focus of this paper.
Problem 1: Given a set V of N nodes with initial health
values v0 = {v
j
0}, a set W of M entities with costs
{ch}, repair rates {∆
j,h
inc}, deterioration rates {∆
j
dec}, and
budget β, find an allocation U (that respects the budget
constraint) and sequences u¯0:∞ that maximize the reward
J(v0,U , u¯0:∞).
We refer to any given allocation U and subsequent repair
sequences u¯0:∞ as a policy. For our purposes, we now
provide the definition of jump.
Definition 2: If an entity h starts targeting a node before
permanently repairing the node it targeted in the last time-
step, then the entity is considered to have jumped at that
time-step. Mathematically, if uht−1 = j, v
j
t < 1 and u
h
t 6= j,
then a jump is said to have been made by entity h at time-
step t. A control sequence that does not contain any jumps
is called a non-jumping sequence.
We now define an α-optimal policy as follows.
Definition 3: Let {U∗, u¯∗0:∞} be an optimal policy (for
allocation of nodes and subsequent repair sequences) of
Problem 1. For α ∈ (0, 1], a policy {U , u¯0:∞} (that re-
spects the budget constraint) is said to be α-optimal if
J(v0,U , u¯0:∞) ≥ αJ(v0,U∗, u¯∗0:∞), ∀v0 ∈ [0, 1]
N .
We will divide our analysis into two parts: one for the
case when the repair rates are sufficiently larger than the
deterioration rates and the other for the case when the
deterioration rates are larger than or equal to the repair rates.
III. POLICIES FOR ∆j,hinc > ∆
j
dec, ∀j ∈ V , h ∈ W
In this section, we assume that the repair rates are suffi-
ciently larger than the deterioration rates. That is, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 1: For all j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and h ∈
{1, . . . ,M}, we assume ∆j,hinc > (N − 1)∆
j
dec and ∆
j,h
inc >∑
k∈{1,...,N}\j ∆
k
dec.
We now present the definition of modified health value.
Definition 4: The modified health value of a node at a
time-step is its health value minus its deterioration rate.
We start by reviewing some useful results pertaining to
repair of nodes by a single entity (from [9]).
A. Finding the largest subset of nodes that can be repaired
by a single agency
We will use the following result (Lemma 4 of [9]).
Lemma 1: Suppose there are N ′(≥ 2) nodes represented
by the set V ′ ⊆ V , and Assumption 1 holds. Then, there
exists a sequence that allows a given entity to permanently
repair z(≤ N ′) nodes if and only if there exists a set
{i1, . . . , iz} ⊆ V ′ such that
v
ij
0 > (z − j)∆
ij
dec, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , z}. (2)
Based on Lemma 1, we now present Algorithm 1 that takes
a given set V ′ ⊆ V , and returns the largest subset Y ⊆ V ′
that can be permanently repaired by a given entity h.
Algorithm 1 Finding the largest set Y that can be perma-
nently repaired by a given entity
Suppose Assumption 1 holds and a set V ′ ⊆ V is given.
Compute
⌈
v
j
0
∆
j
dec
⌉
for each node j ∈ V ′. Set Y = ∅ and
z = 0, and repeat the following until the termination criterion
is satisfied.
• Stop, if there is no node j ∈ V ′ such that
⌈
v
j
0
∆
j
dec
⌉
> z.
Otherwise, let j ∈ V ′ be the node with the lowest value
of
⌈
v
j
0
∆
j
dec
⌉
that satisfies
⌈
v
j
0
∆
j
dec
⌉
> z among all the nodes
in V ′. Remove node j from the set V ′ and add it to the
set Y , and set z = z + 1.
We now present the following result (Lemma 6 of [9]).
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 1 holds and a set V ′ ⊆ V
is given. Let Y be the set obtained from Algorithm 1 and let
z = |Y|. Then, z is the largest number such that there exists
a set Y = {i1, . . . , iz} ⊆ V ′ satisfying (2).
We will also use the following result from [9].
Lemma 3: Suppose a set Uh ∈ V of nodes is allocated to
an entity h and Assumption 1 holds. In order to maximize
the number of nodes that are permanently repaired by h, an
optimal sequencing policy is that entity h should target the
node with the least modified health value at each time step
in the set Uh.
Based on these results, we now turn our attention to the
problem we are focusing in this paper, namely allocating
nodes to multiple entities.
B. Allocating nodes to multiple entities
We start by presenting a property of the optimal allocation
policy.
Lemma 4: Suppose there are N(≥ 2) nodes, M(≤ N)
entities, β ∈ R≥0 ∪ {∞}, and Assumption 1 holds. Then,
it is optimal to allocate the largest number of nodes to the
lowest cost entity, the second largest number of nodes to the
second lowest cost entity, and so on.
Proof: Denote an optimal policy as A = {C,D} where
C represents the allocation of nodes and D represents the
subsequent sequencing policy followed by the entities for
repairing the nodes. By Lemma 3, we can assume without
loss of generality that D is the sequencing policy where each
entity targets the node with the least modified health in its
allocated set at each time-step. Let yj be the number of nodes
that are allocated to entity j ∈ W in C. Suppose there exists
a pair of entities {k, l} ⊆ W such that ck < cl and yk <
yl. Let C
′ be an allocation where entity k is allocated the
set of nodes that is allocated to entity l in C, entity l is
allocated the set of nodes that is allocated to k in C and all
the remaining entities are allocated the same set of nodes
as in C (and the sequencing policy given by Lemma 3 is
followed after the allocation). Then, the allocation C′ would
satisfy the budget constraint because ck < cl, yk < yl and
allocation C satisfies the budget constraint. Also, the number
of nodes that would be permanently repaired by policy B =
{C′, D} would be the same as that by policy A because of
Assumption 1 and Lemma 3. Therefore, one can iteratively
apply the aforementioned argument to obtain a policy where
the largest number of nodes are allocated to the lowest cost
entity, the second largest number of nodes are allocated to
the second lowest cost entity, and so on. Thus, the result
follows.
We now present Algorithm 2 for allocating nodes to
entities. The main idea of Algorithm 2 is to allocate the
nodes by going through the entities in the increasing order
of their costs using Algorithm 1.
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 1: Suppose there are N(≥ 2) nodes, M(≤ N)
entities, β ∈ R≥0 ∪ {∞}, and Assumption 1 holds. Then,
the allocation provided by Algorithm 2, along with the
sequencing policy where each entity targets the node with
the least modified health value in its allocated set at each
time-step, is optimal for Problem 1.
Proof: Let A = {C,D} be an optimal policy where the
allocation of nodes is represented by C and the sequencing
policy by D. By Lemma 3, we can assume without loss
of generality that D is the sequencing policy where each
entity targets the node with the least modified health in its
allocated set at each time-step. Without loss of generality,
we assume that each entity permanently repairs all nodes
allocated to it in policy A (otherwise, the allocated sets
can be reduced in size without affecting the optimality of
Algorithm 2 Allocation of nodes to entities
Suppose there are N(≥ 2) nodes, M(≤ N) entities and
Assumption 1 holds. Set B = V , C =W and γ = β. Repeat
the following until the termination criterion is satisfied.
1) Stop if B = ∅, C = ∅ or γ < c, where c = min{ch, h ∈
C} is the lowest cost per node among the entities in
set C.
2) Otherwise, let s be the entity that has the lowest cost
cs in the set C. Remove s from set C. Denote the set
that is obtained from Algorithm 1 when V ′ = B as Y .
Let x =
⌊
γ
cs
⌋
. If x ≥ |Y|, then allocate set Y to entity
s, remove set Y from set B and let γ = γ − cs|Y|.
Otherwise, allocate a set Y ′ containing x nodes that is
an arbitrary subset of set Y , remove set Y ′ from set B
and let γ = γ − csx.
policy A). Suppose that y nodes are permanently repaired by
following sequencing policy D after allocation C such that
each entity j ∈ W permanently repairs yj(≥ 0) nodes. Then,
y1 + . . . + yM = y. Without loss of generality, we assume
that {1, . . . ,M} represents the order of entities in the non-
decreasing order of their costs (i.e., for all pairs {k, l} ⊆ W ,
ck ≤ cl if k ≤ l).
Let y′ be the total number of nodes that are permanently
repaired when Algorithm 2 along with sequencing policy D
is followed, where each entity j ∈ W permanently repairs
y′j(≥ 0) nodes. We now argue that
∑M
l=1 y
′
l ≥
∑M
l=1 yl.
Consider the case when M = 1. We prove the result through
contradiction. Suppose y′1 < y1. Note that there exists a set of
nodes {i11, . . . , i
1
y1
} that satisfies v
i1k
0 > (y1−k)∆
i1k
dec, ∀k ∈
{1, . . . , y1} by Lemma 1 since y1 nodes are permanently
repaired by entity 1 after allocation C (along with sequencing
policy D). Then, we reach a contradiction because y′1 = |Y
′
1|
is the largest number such that there exists a set Y ′1 ∈ V that
satisfies (2) when z is replaced with y′1 (by Lemma 2). Thus,
the assumption that y′1 < y1 is false.
Now consider the case when M = 2. . We again prove
by contradiction. Suppose y′1 + y
′
2 < y1 + y2. Note that
y′1 ≥ y
′
2 because y
′
1 = |Y
′
1| is the largest number such
that there exists a set Y ′1 ∈ V that satisfies (2) when z is
replaced by y′1. Also, y1 ≥ y2 by Lemma 4. Note that for
each entity j ∈ {1, 2}, there exists a set {ij1, . . . , i
j
yj
} that
satisfies v
i
j
k
0 > (yj − k)∆
i
j
k
dec, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , yj} by Lemma
1 since yj nodes are repaired by entity j after allocation C
(along with sequencing policyD). Without loss of generality,
we can assume that for all j ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ {1, . . . , yj},
node ijk is the node with the lowest value of
⌈
v
i
j
k
0
∆
i
j
k
dec
⌉
such
that
⌈
v
i
j
k
0
∆
i
j
k
dec
⌉
> yj − k in the set V \ {i1k+1, . . . , i
1
y1
} (resp.
V \ {i11, . . . , i
1
y1
, i2k+1, . . . , i
2
y2
}) if j = 1 (resp. j = 2);
otherwise, we could swap ijk with the node l that has the
lowest value of
⌈
vl
0
∆l
dec
⌉
such that
⌈
vl
0
∆l
dec
⌉
> yj−k in the set
V \ {i1k+1, . . . , i
1
y1
} (resp. V \ {i11, . . . , i
1
y1
, i2k+1, . . . , i
2
y2
}) if
j = 1 (resp. j = 2) without affecting the optimality of policy
A. Then, under the aforementioned conditions, Algorithm 2
would allocate the set of nodes {ij1, . . . , i
j
yj
} to each entity
j ∈ {1, 2}. However, this leads to a contradiction because
Algorithm 2 should allocate y′1 + y
′
2(< y1 + y2) nodes.
Therefore, y′1 + y
′
2 < y1 + y2 does not hold.
Consider the case when M = 3. We again prove by
contradiction. Suppose y′1 + y
′
2 + y
′
3 < y1 + y2 + y3. Note
that y′1 ≥ y
′
2 ≥ y
′
3 from the definitions of y
′
1, y
′
2 and y
′
3.
Also, y1 ≥ y2 ≥ y3 by Lemma 4. Note that for each entity
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there exists a set {ij1, . . . , i
j
yj
} that satisfies
v
i
j
k
0 > (yj − k)∆
i
j
k
dec, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , yj} by Lemma 1
since yj nodes are repaired by entity j after allocation C
(along with sequencing policyD). Without loss of generality,
we can assume that for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, k ∈ {1, . . . , yj},
node ijk is the node with the lowest value of
⌈
v
i
j
k
0
∆
i
j
k
dec
⌉
such
that
⌈
v
i
j
k
0
∆
i
j
k
dec
⌉
> yj − k in the set V \ {i1k+1, . . . , i
1
y1
}
(resp. V \ {i11, . . . , i
1
y1
, . . . , ij−11 , . . . , i
j−1
yj−1
, ijk+1, . . . , i
j
yj
}) if
j = 1 (resp. j ≥ 2); otherwise, we could swap ijk with
the node l that has the lowest value of
⌈
vl
0
∆l
dec
⌉
such that⌈
vl
0
∆l
dec
⌉
> yj − k in the set V \ {i
1
k+1, . . . , i
1
y1
} (resp.
V \ {i11, . . . , i
1
y1
, . . . , ij−11 , . . . , i
j−1
yj−1
, ijk+1, . . . , i
j
yj
}) if j = 1
(resp. j ≥ 2) without affecting the optimality of policy
A. Then, under the aforementioned conditions, Algorithm 2
would allocate the set of nodes {ij1, . . . , i
j
yj
} to each entity
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. However, this leads to a contradiction because
Algorithm 2 should allocate y′1 + y
′
2 + y
′
3(< y1 + y2 + y3)
nodes. Therefore, the assumption y′1+y
′
2+y
′
3 < y1+y2+y3
is not true.
Proceeding in the above way we can argue that
∑M
l=1 y
′
l ≥∑M
l=1 yl for all values of M . Thus, the number of nodes
that are permanently repaired by Algorithm 2 along with
sequencing policy D is not less than that by allocation
C along with sequencing policy D. Note that allocation
provided by Algorithm 2 satisfies the budget constraint
because the largest possible set of size y′1 is allocated to
entity 1, the second largest possible set of size y′2 is allocated
to entity 2 and so on, in Algorithm 2 and allocation C
satisfies the budget constraint.
Remark 2: Note that Algorithm 1 has polynomial-time
complexity as argued in [9]. Algorithm 2 also has polynomial
time complexity because it involves a loop that executes
Algorithm 1 at most M times.
We now give an example to illustrate Algorithm 2.
Example 1: Consider four nodes a, b, c and d such that
va0 = 0.05, v
b
0 = 0.15, v
c
0 = 0.06 and v
d
0 = 0.07. Suppose
there are two entities e and f such that ce = 6 units and
cf = 8 units. The total budget is β = 19 units. Also, suppose
∆a,einc = ∆
a,f
inc = ∆
b,e
inc = ∆
b,f
inc = ∆
c,e
inc = ∆
c,f
inc = ∆
d,e
inc =
∆d,finc = 0.4 and ∆
a
dec = ∆
b
dec = ∆
c
dec = ∆
d
dec = 0.1.
If Algorithm 2 is followed for the allocation then entity
e (which is the least costly among the two entities) is
first allocated the nodes a and b as node a is the node
j ∈ {a, b, c, d} with the lowest value of
⌈
v
j
0
∆
j
dec
⌉
such that⌈
v
j
0
∆
j
dec
⌉
> 0, b is the only node j ∈ {b, c, d} such that⌈
v
j
0
∆
j
dec
⌉
> 1 and there is no node j ∈ {c, d} such that⌈
v
j
0
∆
j
dec
⌉
> 2. Note that γ = 19− 6 − 6 = 7 after allocating
the nodes to entity e. Thus, it is not possible to allocate any
nodes to entity f as γ = 7 < 8 = cF . After the allocation
of nodes a and b to entity e, the sequence of targeting the
node with the least modified health value at each time-step is
followed by entity e, which permanently repairs both nodes.
IV. POLICIES FOR ∆jdec ≥ ∆
j,h
inc, ∀j ∈ V , h ∈ W
In this section, we analyze the case when the deterioration
rates are larger (but not necessarily significantly larger) than
the repair rates. We will use the following assumption in this
section.
Assumption 2: Suppose for all j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and h ∈
{1, . . . ,M}, ∆j,hinc = ∆
h
inc, ∆
j
dec = ∆dec, ∆dec ≥ ∆
h
inc and
ch = c
′. Also, for each entity h ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, suppose there
exists a positive integer nh such that ∆dec = nh∆
h
inc. Also,
for each node j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and entity h ∈ {1, . . . ,M},
suppose there exists a positive integermhj such that 1−v
j
0 =
mhj∆
h
inc.
The above assumption ensures that no node gets perma-
nently repaired partway through a time-step.
We will use the following result for repair of nodes by a
single entity from [8].
Lemma 5: Suppose a set Uh is allocated to an entity h
and Assumption 2 holds. In order to maximize the number
of nodes that are permanently repaired by h, an optimal
sequencing policy is that entity h should target the healthiest
node in Uh at each time step.2
We now start with the following result.
Lemma 6: Let there be N(≥ 2) nodes, M(≤ N) entities,
β =∞, and suppose Assumption 2 holds. Consider a policy
A = {C,D} where C is the allocation policy andD is a non-
jumping sequencing policy where each entity targets a set of
nodes in decreasing order of their initial health. Suppose k is
the pth healthiest node (where 1 ≤ p ≤ M ) at t = 0. Also,
suppose k is not targeted by an entity at t = 0 but all the top
p−1 healthiest nodes are targeted at t = 0 in D. Let a be an
entity that does not target a node that belongs to the set of
top p− 1 healthiest nodes at t = 0. Suppose entity a targets
nodes {i1, . . . , if} in sequencing policy D and permanently
repairs all of them. Let x be the number of nodes that are
permanently repaired in policy A. Consider another policy
B = {C′, E} where allocation C′ is the same as C except
that k is allocated to entity a, and entity a targets node k
at t = 0 and follows the sequence {i1, . . . , if−1} afterwards
in E; all the other entities target the remaining nodes in the
2 Equivalently, the optimal sequence is the non-jumping sequence that
targets the nodes in decreasing order of their initial health values in the set
Uh.
same order as that in D. Then, at least x − 1 nodes are
permanently repaired in B.
Proof: Note that the allocation C′ satisfies the budget
constraint since β =∞. We first focus on entity a. Note that
k /∈ {i1, . . . , if} because v
k
0 > v
i1
0 and a targets the nodes
{i1, . . . , if} in the decreasing order of their initial health
in sequencing policy D. Also, the nodes k, i1, . . . , if−1
are targeted at an earlier time in sequencing policy E by
entity a as compared to the nodes i1, . . . , if in D since
vk0 > max{v
i1
0 , . . . , v
if
0 } and v
i1
0 ≥ . . . ≥ v
if
0 (as each entity
targets a set of the nodes in the decreasing order of their
initial health). Thus, entity a permanently repairs the nodes
k, i1, . . . , if−1 in E.
We now compare the number of nodes that are perma-
nently repaired by the entities apart from entity a in the
sequencing policies D and E. Note that either node k is
not permanently repaired in D or node k is permanently
repaired by an entity b(6= a) in D (note that entities a and b
cannot be the same because entity a does not target node k
in D as mentioned before). Consider the case when no entity
permanently repairs node k in D. Then, all the entities other
than entity a would permanently repair the same number of
nodes in E as that in D. We now consider the case when
node k is permanently repaired by entity b in D. Suppose
entity b permanently repairs g nodes in D. Denote the order
that is followed by entity b for targeting the nodes in D as
{i′1, i
′
2, . . . , i
′
g}, where i
′
j = k such that 1 ≤ j ≤ g. Since
entity b follows the same order for targeting the nodes in E
as that followed in D, at least g − 1 nodes (i.e., the nodes
{i′1, . . . , i
′
j−1, i
′
j+1, . . . , i
′
g}) would be permanently repaired
by b in E as these nodes would start to get targeted at an
earlier or same time-step in comparison to D. Note that all
the remaining entities (i.e., entities apart from a and b) would
permanently repair the same number of nodes in both D and
E. Thus, the number of nodes that are permanently repaired
in policy B = {C′, E} is at least equal to x− 1.
We now present the main result of this section that
provides an online policy where the nodes are sequentially
allocated to entities and the entities permanently repair their
currently allocated nodes before they are allocated new
nodes.
Theorem 2: Suppose there are N(≥ 2) nodes, M(≤ N)
entities, β ∈ R≥0∪{∞}, and Assumption 2 holds. Consider
the online policy where at each time-step the healthiest node
that is currently not being targeted is allocated to an entity
that is currently not repairing any node, until there are no
more nodes to allocate or the budget runs out. Then, the
aforementioned policy is 1/2-optimal for Problem 1.
Proof: Let A = {C,D} be an optimal policy where
the allocation of nodes is given by C and the subsequent
sequencing policy by D. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that D is the policy where each entity targets the
healthiest node in its allocated set at each time-step (or, the
non-jumping sequence of targeting the allocated nodes in the
decreasing order of their initial health) by Lemma 5. We now
argue that the online policy would permanently repair at least
half the number of nodes as those by policy A because of
the following argument.
Let Xt ⊆ W contain all the entities that are unassigned at
time-step t (i.e., those entities that are not currently busy
in targeting previously allocated nodes at time-step t) in
sequencing policy D. Let Yt ⊆ V be the set of all the nodes
that have health values in the interval (0, 1) at time-step t
and have not been targeted before time-step t in sequencing
policy D. Let lt = min{|Xt|, |Yt|}. We now go to the first
time-step T in sequencing policy D at which lT ≥ 1 and
at least one of the top lT healthiest nodes is not targeted at
time-step T . Suppose k is the pth healthiest node in the set
YT (where 1 ≤ p ≤ lT ) such that k is not targeted by an
entity in XT but the p− 1 healthiest nodes in the set YT are
targeted by the entities in XT . Let a be an entity in the set
XT that does not target one of the p− 1 healthiest nodes at
time-step T . Suppose entity a permanently repairs f nodes
from time-step T onwards in D. Let E be a sequencing
policy which is the same as D from time-step 0 to T −1 but
the portion of E from time-step T onwards is such that node
k is targeted by entity a at time-step T , entity a targets the
first f − 1 nodes that it targeted in D after targeting node k
and the remaining entities target the nodes in the same order
as in D. Then, at least x − 1 nodes would be permanently
repaired in sequencing policy E by Lemma 6.
We iteratively repeat the above procedure so that at each
time-step t the healthiest node that has not been targeted
before is allocated to an entity that is available at time-step
t. Note that since the number of nodes that are permanently
repaired in the given sequencing policy either decreases
or remains the same in each iteration of this procedure,
the total cost of the permanently repaired nodes does not
increase during this procedure as the costs are homogeneous
across all the entities by Assumption 2. Thus, the final
allocation satisfies the budget constraint as allocation C is
a feasible allocation. Therefore, the aforementioned online
policy is 1/2-optimal because 1) at each iteration of this
iterative procedure, we move at least one node across the
given sequencing policy and the number of nodes that are
permanently repaired reduces by at most one, and 2) in
the last iteration of this procedure when there is only one
node, there is no decrease in the number of nodes that
are permanently repaired because if the last node in the
given sequencing policy can be permanently repaired then
a healthier node can also be permanently repaired as once
a node starts to get targeted in a non-jumping sequencing
policy it is always permanently repaired.
Remark 3: Note that although the policy provided in
Theorem 2 is online, it can also be used as an offline
policy to first find an allocation of nodes to entities and
then the sequencing policy where each entity targets the
allocated nodes in the decreasing order of their initial health
is followed.
We now provide an example to illustrate the online policy.
Example 2: Consider four nodes a, b, c and d such that
va0 = 0.9, v
b
0 = 0.8, v
c
0 = 0.6 and v
d
0 = 0.5. Suppose there
are two entities e and f such that ce = cf = c
′ = 6 units.
The total budget is β = 23 units. Also, suppose ∆einc =
∆finc = 0.1 and ∆dec = 0.2. Then, the nodes a and b are
allocated to the entities e and f , respectively, (note that a and
b could have also been allocated to f and e, respectively) at
time-step t = 0 when the online policy is followed. Note that
the budget that is available after the allocation of nodes at
t = 0 is equal to γ = 23− 6− 6 = 11. Then, the time after
time-step 0 at which the healthiest node gets permanently
repaired is t = 1 when node a gets permanently repaired,
and entity e becomes available and thus can be allocated
another node. Thus, node c is allocated to entity e and the
budget that is available after this allocation is γ = 11−6 = 5.
Since γ = 5 < 6 = c′, it is not possible to allocate node d to
any entity. Thus, nodes a and c are allocated to e and node
b is allocated to f .
Note that although we assumed that the costs are homo-
geneous across the entities in Assumption 2, the problem
of finding the optimal policy under this assumption is non-
trivial as shown in the following examples.
Example 3: Consider three nodes a, b and c such that
va0 = 0.9, v
b
0 = 0.8 and v
c
0 = 0.2. Suppose there are two
entities d and e such that c′ = 6 units. The total budget
is β = 25 units. Also, suppose ∆dinc = ∆
e
inc = 0.1 and
∆dec = 0.2. If the nodes are allocated based on the online
policy then the nodes a and b are allocated to entities d
and e, respectively, (note that a and b could have also been
allocated to e and d, respectively) at t = 0. Note that
by the time node a (i.e., the healthiest node at t = 0) is
permanently repaired, node c permanently fails and thus is
not allocated to any entity. Therefore, the nodes a and b
are permanently repaired from the online policy. However,
if the nodes a and b are allocated to entity d, and node c
is allocated to entity e, then the aforementioned allocation
satisfies the budget constraint and it is possible to repair
all the nodes by following the sequence where each entity
targets the healthiest node in the allocated set at each time-
step. Thus, the online policy, in general, is not optimal. Note
that although the aforementioned policy is not optimal in this
example, it is indeed 1/2-optimal as proved in Theorem 2.
Note that the policy of giving the largest subset of nodes
that can be repaired to one entity, the second largest subset
of nodes that can be repaired to the second entity and so on,
is optimal in the above example but it may not be optimal
under Assumption 2 as shown next (note that this policy was
indeed optimal in the previous section).
Example 4: Consider four nodes a, b, c and d such that
va0 = 0.9, v
b
0 = 0.8, v
c
0 = 0.4 and v
d
0 = 0.3. Suppose there
are two entities e and f such that c′ = 6 units. The total
budget is β = 25 units. Also, suppose ∆einc = ∆
f
inc =
∆dec = 0.1. If an entity (say entity e) is to be allocated the
largest set of nodes that it can permanently repair, then e
would be allocated nodes a and b. Then, entity f would
be allocated node c as it can only repair one node out
of the remaining nodes c and d. Thus, node d would not
be allocated to any entity in the aforementioned allocation
policy and thus only nodes a, b and c are permanently
repaired. However, if the proposed online policy is used then
nodes a and b are allocated to the two entities (in any order)
at t = 0. After permanently repairing node a (resp. b) it is
possible to allocate node c (resp. d) to the entity that becomes
available. Thus, all the nodes are permanently repaired by the
online policy in this example.
Although the above examples show that finding the op-
timal policy in general is non-trivial, the proposed online
policy is optimal when there is a single entity as discussed
next.
Proposition 1: Suppose there are N(≥ 2) nodes, M = 1,
β ∈ R≥0 ∪ {∞}, and Assumption 2 holds. Consider the
online policy where at each time-step the healthiest node
that has not been targeted before is allocated to the entity if
the entity is currently not repairing any node, until there are
no more nodes to allocate or the budget runs out. Then, the
aforementioned policy is optimal for Problem 1.
Proof: The proof of this result starts similarly as the
proof of Theorem 2 by considering an optimal policy A =
{C,D} where the nodes are targeted in the decreasing order
of their initial health value in sequencing policy D. Note that
since there is only one entity, there will be no time-step T
in D where the healthiest node is not targeted by the entity
and thus there will be no reduction in the length of D due to
the iterative procedure as in Theorem 2. Since the allocation
C satisfies the budget constraint, the result follows.
We now give an example to show that the online policy is
not 1/2-optimal when the deterioration and repair rates are
heterogeneous across the nodes.
Example 5: Consider five nodes a, b, c, d and e such that
va0 = 0.8, v
b
0 = 0.8, v
c
0 = 0.6, v
d
0 = 0.6 and v
e
0 = 0.6.
Suppose there are two entities f and g such that c′ = 1 unit.
The total budget is β = 6 units. The deterioration rates are
given by ∆a,fdec = ∆
a,g
dec = ∆
b,f
dec = ∆
b,g
dec = 0.05,∆
c,f
dec =
∆c,gdec = ∆
d,f
dec = ∆
d,g
dec = 0.2 and ∆
e,f
dec = ∆
e,g
dec = 0.6. The
repair rates are given by ∆a,finc = ∆
a,g
inc = ∆
b,f
inc = ∆
b,g
inc =
0.05,∆c,finc = ∆
c,g
inc = ∆
d,f
inc = ∆
d,g
inc = 0.2 and ∆
e,f
inc =
∆e,ginc = 0.4. If the online policy is followed then nodes a
and b are allocated to entities f and g (in any order) at t = 0
but the remaining nodes permanently fail by the time they
are reached (as shown in Table I); so only nodes a and b are
allocated and are permanently repaired. However, consider
the allocation where the nodes a, c and e are allocated to
entity f and nodes b and d are allocated to entity g (note
that this allocation satisfies the budget constraint). After the
allocation, entity f permanently repairs all the three allocated
nodes when it first targets node e, then node c and finally
node a (as shown in Table II). Also, entity g permanently
repairs the remaining two nodes by first targeting node d and
then node b (as shown in Table III). Since all the five nodes
are permanently repaired after the aforementioned allocation
in comparison to two nodes that are permanently repaired by
the online policy, the latter policy is not 1/2-optimal when
the deterioration and repair rates are heterogeneous across
the nodes.
We now provide an example to show that the online policy
is not 1/2-optimal when the costs are heterogeneous across
the entities.
TABLE I: Health progression in Example 5 when the online
policy is followed.
Time-step (t) va
t
vb
t
vc
t
vd
t
ve
t
0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6
4 1 1 0 0 0
TABLE II: Health progression in Example 5 when nodes a,
c and e are targeted by entity f .
Time-step (t) va
t
vc
t
ve
t
0 0.8 0.6 0.6
1 0.75 0.4 1
4 0.6 1 1
12 1 1 1
Example 6: Consider five nodes a, b, c, d and e such that
va0 = v
b
0 = v
c
0 = v
d
0 = v
e
0 = 0.95. Suppose there are two
entities f and g such that cf = 1 and cg = 5. Also, the total
budget is β = 6 units. Suppose ∆finc = ∆
g
inc = ∆dec = 0.1.
Then, two nodes get allocated to the entities at t = 0
in the online policy and the remaining budget after the
allocation of these nodes is γ = 6 − 1 − 5 = 0. Thus, it
is not possible to allocate any more nodes to the entities
and therefore two nodes are permanently repaired by the
online policy. However, if all the nodes are allocated to entity
f (note that this allocation satisfies the budget constraint),
then it permanently repairs all the nodes. Since five nodes
are permanently repaired by the aforementioned policy in
comparison to two nodes by the online policy, the latter
policy is not 1/2-optimal when the costs are heterogeneous
across the entities.
Remark 4: Note that we do not provide the results for the
case when ∆jdec < ∆
j,h
inc < (N − 1)∆
j
dec, ∀j ∈ V , h ∈ W .
The paper [9] gave some examples to show that when there is
a single entity and there is no budget constraint, sequencing
policies such as targeting the healthiest node at each time-
step or targeting the node with the least modified health value
at each time-step need not be optimal for this case. Thus, the
analysis of this case remains open for future research.
V. SUMMARY
We characterized policies for allocation and repair se-
quencing for recovering damaged components after disasters
when there are multiple entities available for repair and there
is a budget constraint. There can be several future extensions
of this work: considering stochasticity in the deterioration
and repair rates, introducing interdependencies between the
components, characterizing an optimal policy for case in
Section IV and considering time-dependent deterioration
rates are some of those.
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